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It is not money what makes the world go round, but credit. 
J.E. Stiglitz (1988) 
 
The paper presents a tractable model of an old topic which is becoming more and more 
important in modern macroeconomics: the link between financial structure and economic 
activity.
1 During our lectures in advanced macroeconomics at ITAM and COLEF, we have 
realized the need for models which can illustratively describe the dynamics of allocation of 
credit and its impact of aggregate variables, such as output, money, interest rates, etc. 
Perhaps the most celebrated model of this type is that of Blinder (1987) on credit 
restrictions and their impact on effective supply. Here, we present a simpler dynamic model 
taking as a reference the seminal work made by Bernanke & Blinder (1988) where the 
interaction mechanisms between credit and aggregate demand are clearly analysed. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section I presents the most important aspects of the 
Bernanke-Blinder model in its original static structure and its main conclusion. Section II 
presents a dynamic model following that of Bernanke & Blinder. And finally, Section III 
highlights the main implications of using such a model as a illustrative method. We hope 
this work serve as a guide for undergraduate advanced lectures and graduate lectures and 
help to promote more illustrative models of this type which are severely rationed in 
macroeconomic textbooks. 
 
I     The Bernanke-Blinder Model 
 
Bernanke & Blinder (1988) develop a static model under the IS-LM framework which 
looks for an understanding of the relationship between credit and economic performance. 
Perhaps, the most important characteristic of that model is that introduces a third financial 
asset into the economy (i.e., credit). The conventional macroeconomic method assume that 
the economy presents two perfect-substitutable assets (i.e., bonds and money) which work 
smoothly under the “Walras Law”. According to Bernanke & Blinder, recent studies on the 
theoretical and empirical relevance of imperfect information in financial markets (the 
influential model of Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981, for example) stress the importance of banks as 
“special” institutions in the monetary transmission mechanism.
2 
 
In their model, Bernanke & Blinder abandon an important assumption in the traditional 
framework: perfect substitutability between bonds and credit. Besides, they assume not to 
introduce credit rationing because, as it will be shown later, it is not a crucial aspect fot the 
credit view. Then, they assume a credit market that can be cleared at any point in time. I 
will follow these assumptions in the Section III. 
 
                                                            
1 See Gertler (1988) for an excellent survey. 
2 This is a crucial aspect of the “credit view”. There is a huge literature on this concept which will not be 
covered here. For more details, see surveys by Bernanke (1992-93), Gertler (1988), Gertler & Gilchrist 
(1993). 
  2 Bernanke & Blinder present a demand for credit which depends on the rate on loans (ρ), 
the market interest rate, i.e., the rate on bonds (i), and finally on an autonomous transaction 
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On the other hand, the supply of credit is determined by banks’ balance sheet (i.e., reserves 
(R) plus bonds (B) plus loans (L) must equal total deposits assuming equity zero), and 
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Implicitly, λρ>0 assumes no credit rationing and therefore there is no upper bound for the 
interest rates where credit can be restricted because beyond that point bank’s profits may 
decrease as a result of moral hazard and adverse selection effects as in Stiglitz & Weiss 
(1981). Both equations represents the typical LM curve. 
 
Finally, the goods market is affected not only by a Keynesian mechanism (interest rates 
affecting investment and consumption) but also it depends on the rate on loans granted by 
the financial institutions, which is interpreted as an alternative mechanism called 
“nonmonetary” channel.
3 The following equation represents an adjusted IS curve which the 
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In this latter equation, the rate on loans is made to be endogenously determined by the rate 
on bonds, output and monetary policy through bank reserves. In essence, the demand and 
supply for loans determine their rate in a market which has no imperfections and it is 
competitive. In turn, the rate on loans affects aggregate demand via bank reserves which 
can be seen as a policy determining the availability of bank loans.
4 
 
The comparative statics made by Bernanke & Blinder introduces the “nonmonetary” 
mechanism into the IS-LM framework. Such  a mechanism is created in the credit market 
and the propagation effects into the goods market are canalised by the rate on loans (ρ). Let 
                                                            
3 The introduction of a link between the rate on loans and the goods markets is made considering the market 
for deposits where the monetary policy is done by reserves positions (a positive reserve position or a negative 
one as in Tobin (1982)). 
4 Here the assumption of bank loans being no perfect substitutes of bonds takes special relevance. 
  3 illustrate two cases shown in their paper: a) a higher demand for credit and b) a lower credit 
supply.  
 
a)  Higher demand for credit 
 
This case will be interpreted as an adverse selection effect in the next Section. In other 
words, borrowers are perceiving less risk and, absent of informational problems, they are 
exogenously increasing the demand for credit money (See Figure 1.a). The authors 
exemplify this case as an increase in the need for working capital by firms or higher 
liquidity needs.
5 The result is a decrease in the CC curve with a LM constant (Figure 1.b). 
 
Figure 1 
A higher demand for credit in the Bernanke-Blinder model 
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  Figure  1.a      Figure  1.b   
 
b) Lower supply of credit 
 
This case will be interpreted as an inverse moral hazard effect in the next section. It is 
called inverse because it generates a reduction in the supply (Figure 2.a).
6 Some authors 
have identified several causes for an inverse moral hazard effect. For example, Bernanke’s 
(1983) main conclusion about the Great Depression lies in the heart of this point: “The 
banking problems of 1930-1933 disrupted the credit allocation process by creating large, 
unplanned changes in the channels of credit flow. Fear of runs led to large withdrawals of 
deposits, precautionary increases in reserve-deposit ratios, and an increased desire by banks 
for very liquid or discountable assets. These factors, plus the actual failures, forced a 
contraction of the banking system’s role in the intermediation of credit. Some of the slack 
                                                            
5 This case is also consistent with the post-keynesian approach where money is considered endogenous in the 
sense of  being credit driven and demand determined. Thus, an exogenous increase in the demand for credit 
would move its supply (they are interdependent). In this approach, credit is determined solely by demand 
because banks has unlimited access to funds due to financial innovations developed in wholesale markets.  
See Moore (1989) and Goodhart (1989) for more on this perspective. 
6 On the other hand, a positive moral hazard effect in the credit market would result from the fact that lenders 
are perceiving less risk in granting loans increasing the supply of credit. This effect would be a result of an 
inefficient regulatory framework, i.e., deposit insurance or anticipated ex-post Central Bank interventions, 
which can create incentives for banks to undertake risky activities. 
  4 was taken up by the growing importance of alternative channels of credit. However, the 
rapid switch away from the banks...no doubt impaired financial efficiency and raised the 
cost of credit intermediation”.
7 In short, a higher perception of risk by banks caused by an 
increase in real cost of credit intermediation led to a disruption in the normal credit flow 
reducing the supply of credit. In the static model this would be illustrated as follows. 
 
Figure 2 
A lower supply of credit in the Bernanke-Blinder model 
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  Figure  2.a      Figure  2.b 
 
From my point of view, the most important contribution of the Bernanke-Blinder model is 
that it helps us to understand the link between the financial sector variables, such as the rate 
on loans, credit allocation, the degree of risk perceived by economic agents, institutional 
and regulatory schemes, etc. and the real sector variables such as output, aggregate 
demand, and market rates without assuming any specific formation of expectations, 
restrictions in the credit market, or anything else. They resume their results in a table which 
is presented below. 
 
Rise in:  y  M  L  i  ρ 
R  ↑  ↑  ↑  ↓  ↓ 
Md  ↓  ↑  ↓  ↑  ↓ 
Ls  ↑  ↑  ↑  ↑  ↓ 
Ld  ↓  ↓  ↑  ↓  ↑ 
y  ↑  ↑  ↑  ↑  ↑ 
 
 
This general framework of the Bernanke-Blinder model presented above will be developed 
in the next section using a dynamic representation. In the long run, variables will interact in 
the same way as in the model, but short run dynamics will be generated under several 
assumptions, many of them consistent with the basic story. Remember that the main 
  5 
                                                            
7 Bernanke, B. “Nonmonetary effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression” in 
“New Keynesian Economics” Vol. II, edited by G. Mankiw and D. Romer, MIT Press, pp. 302-303. motivation of this paper is due to exposition reasons, it does not attempt to provide any 




II     The Dynamics of the Bernanke-Blinder model 
 
In general terms, macroeconomic textbooks suffer from an evident lack of discussion about 
credit and financial aspects. This is of course more critical in advanced textbooks where in 
other areas of macroeconomics there have been a mathematical and theoretical revolution. 
However, during the 80’s, the macroeconomics of credit and financial intermediation had 
important contributions (many of them are cited in this article) and developed several 
analytical tools. Motivated by both factors, we present a simple dynamic model where the 
interaction between financial and real factors is explained both in the short run and in the 
long run. The main idea is to facilitate lectures using a general framework which, as I will 
discuss later, can be extended and complemented with different assumptions. 
 
There is, of course, a seminal article by Blinder (1987) which might look for the same 
motivations as this one. However, because of its complexity and the use of the credit 
rationing assumption, it does not provide a general framework for exposition purposes 
during undergraduate lectures. So, we believe, there is a need for a basic tool which should 
be complicated depending on the teaching level. Here we present a model which follows 
the same structure as that of Bernanke & Blinder explained before and tries to reach the 
same conclusions, at least in the long run. 
 
As in the Bernanke-Blinder model, the assumption is that there is no credit rationing 
equilibrium in the long run,
8 loans and bonds are imperfect substitutes, fixed prices,
9 output 
is a predetermined state variable which moves gradually in response to shocks, and the rate 
on loans is a non-predetermined variable. 
 
a) The model 
 
The CC curve in the Bernanke-Blinder model, which incorporates the real sector variables, 
will be transformed to a simple short run-long run adjustment between demand and supply 
for goods. Because prices are fixed, adjustments in the short run are made through 
aggregate demand (supply) excesses which generates the dynamics of output. When an 
excess aggregate demand is observed, output will increase (a decline in firms’ inventories) 
and conversely, when an excess aggregate supply is observed (or what is the same in 
qualitative terms, when output is below its long run level) output will decline.  
 
                                                            
8 By not introducing credit rationing, I do not think it will create any difference from the main results. It does 
not hit on my mind anyway because as noted by Bernanke: “...credit rationing is not at all necessary for the 
credit channel to exist. All that is required for a credit channel is that bank credit and other forms of credit be 
imperfect substitutes for borrowers”. Bernanke (1992-93), pp. 56. 
9 Blinder (1987) present a dynamic model where prices can adjust via a demand-supply mechanism or via a 
Phillips curve adjustment. 
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As in the model in the first section, aggregate demand (yd) depends on the rate on loans, the 
market rate, and we introduce a fiscal policy index (G). In the same spirit, the market rate is 
determined by monetary policy (bank reserves, R) and the demand for money (Md). 
 
         f ρ < 0,  fG > 0,  fi  <   0         ( 2 )   yf G
d = (, , ) ρ
     ih    h R < 0,  hMd  >   0        ( 3 )   R M
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The dynamics of the financial sector, the LM curve, come from the evolution during time 
of a single relevant variable in the Bernanke-Blinder model, the price of loans (ρ). Here we 
assume that because of no credit rationing, this variable will adjust through demand or 
supply excesses in credit market. So we let credit rationing, i.e., demand excess, exists at 
least in the short run. But there is no credit rationing equilibrium in the long run as in 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). If there is an excess demand for loans, their price will increase 
up to the point where supply and demand are equal. The same dynamics apply for an excess 
supply for credit. 
 




     LL    L ρ < 0,  Li > 0, Ly > 0,  Lσd < 0       (5)  i y
d = (, ,, ) ρσ
      λρ > 0,  λi < 0, λσs  <  0      (6)  Li
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Also, the demand for credit equation is a function of the rate of loans, the market rate, 
output (transaction motive), but differing with Bernanke & Blinder, I introduce a fourth 
variable that captures any exogenous shock in the demand for loans (σd). This demand push 
factor on Ld can be interpreted as a risk degree variable affecting borrowers. For example, 
the adverse selection effect shown in the last section will be transformed into a decrease in 
σd, i.e., less risk is perceived by borrowers.
10 Also, σd captures any exogenous move in the 
borrowers desire for working capital change or liquidity not necessarily related to changes 
in the lending risks. 
 
Similarly, the supply of loans depends on the same factors as in the previous model but 
there is an extra variable which captures the degree of risk in banks’ credit allocation. σs 
represents this degree variable (supply push factor). For example, less degree of risk 
perceived by lenders (a decrease in σs) will induce them to increase loans to potential 
borrowers, creating a positive moral hazard effect. In this case, any of the regulatory and 
institutional variables commented in footnote 6 can be observed, and an upward shift in Ls 
will result. On the other hand, in the case presented in the first section, an exogenous 
increase in real cost of credit intermediation will be thought as an increase in σs. 
 
10 A notable example of a variable affected by legal and institutional aspects which affects σd is the current 
bankruptcy law. If there are incentives for borrowers protected by an inefficient scheme of corporate 
bankruptcies, they will have higher incentives to undertake riskier projects and the demand for loans will shift 
upward due to an adverse selection effect. 
  7  
b)  The dynamics 
 
Equations (1) and (4) are clearly linear. Unfortunately, it will be almost impossible to 
characterise a demand (or supply) for credit equation. Thus, I will continue using general 
equations as of L, λ, f, and h. The dynamics in the real sector can be described as follows, 
linearizing around the long run level of each variable using a first-order Taylor expansion 
series.  
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Since β >0,   is stable.  y
•
Figure 3 










Following the same procedure as above, the dynamics of the financial sector are, 
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And, since α > 0 and (Lρ − λρ) < 0,   is stable.  ρ
•
  Figure  4 











Then we can obtain the correspondent matrix for this system of two differential equations. 
 
























































































As commonly, the dynamics of both differential equations are presented in a phase diagram 
(Figure 5). There can be seen that  = 0 has a negative slope, and  =0 has a positive slope 







  Figure  5 
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In summary, we have a system which is totally stable. Whenever the economy starts, it will 
end up to a point such “e0” in the diagram. So long we have identified the characteristics of 
the system graphically. Now we need to observe the change of variables in the long run 





c) Long run comparative statics  
 
In the long run, variables will adjust according to exogenous or policy shocks observed in 
the non-dependant variables (G , R, σd , σs). It is easy to see the long run effects of ρ and y 
through the use of the following relationships. 
 
                                                            



























































i.e., an increase in public expenditure will affect output increasing its long run level. 
Therefore,  = 0 must shift to the right.  =0 is unaffected since G does not directly 



















































i.e., an open market purchase (more bank reserves) allows banks to lend more (in terms of 
Tobin (1982), there is an excess reserve position). This increases the supply of credit 
lowering the cost of bank funds and moving the economy to an upper long run level. To be 


































































i.e., shocks in the financial sector have important effects on output and interest rates in 
these model. For instance, if more risk is perceived by lenders (σs increases), they will 
reduce its supply and therefore the cost of credit will rise lowering long run level of output. 
This can be graphically illustrated by a shift to the left in  =0.  ρ
•
 
We have characterised the long run adjustments, but it is necessary to clarify movements in 
the short run. In doing so, we will need to assume that output responses gradually to 
shocks, although being a predetermined variable, and that the rate of loans is a non 
predetermined variable (endogenous jumps are allowed). 
 
In the next part we will illustrate some of the consequences of having such assumptions in 
the state variables. Then, short run adjustments will differ from the basic Bernanke-Blinder 
story, although there is no relevant variant in the long run as observed before. 
 
                                                            
12 Implicitly, we are assuming that ∂ρ and so 
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  10 d) Some implications of exogenous shocks (σd , σs) 
 
Here we will present how the financial structure can affect real sector variables both in the 
short run and in the long run. As previously explained, σd  and  σs have important 
consequences in the economy. Depending on the structure of the financial sector the real 
effects will interact through the flow of credit. A decrease in σs (less risk is perceived by 
lenders) can be a result of a institutional and regulatory framework which incentives 
lenders to more risky activities. For example, sub-optimal premium charged by a Deposit 
Insurance Institution or an inefficient scheme of credit classification might create a positive 
moral hazard effect that allows a credit expansion in the economy. This results, as 
explained above, in a higher level of output in the long run and a lower long run level of the 
price of loans (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6 
Less risk perceived by lenders creates a positive moral hazard effect 
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A decrease in σd will generate the opposite effects.
13 More need for working capital or 
liquidity by firms will impinge the demand for credit to a higher long run level rising the 
cost of funds. Then, if the supply of loans is held constant, output will reduce in the long 
run (Figure 7) as noted in the basic Bernanke-Blinder model.  
 
  11 
                                                            
13 This case is qualitatively similar to an increase in the risk observed by lenders (higher σs). As discussed 
before, higher supply push factor can be a result of a rise in the real cost of credit intermediation.  
 
Figure 7 
Less risk perceived by borrowers creates an adverse selection effect 
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e) Some policy implications (G , R, Md) 
 
In this part of the section our purpose is to relate real sector variables with some policy 
actions. An expansionary fiscal policy (via government expenditure, G) will have the 
traditional Keynesian results: by rising the cost of bank credit and market interest rates 
output will be higher in the long run. The increase in output is not too high as in the case 




Higher government purchases generate a traditional Keynesian result 
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  12 A monetary policy can exist in the Bernanke-Blinder model through bank reserves (R). If 
reserves are increased due to, for instance, an open market purchase banks will have more 
availability to lend, the supply of credit will be higher and consequently, the rate of loans 
will decline and output will rise in the long run (Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9 
More availability to lend for banks (higher reserves) induces a greater supply of credit 
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On the other hand, an exogenous increase in the demand for money will reduce the demand 
for bank credit since they are substitutes. A lower long run level of loans, their price, and 
output will then result (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10 
Higher demand for money induces a lower demand for credit 
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Section III Main Implications and Conclusions 
  13  
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) constructed a simple model incorporating a bank loan channel in a modified IS-
LM framework. For this channel to exist, some firms must be bank dependent and monetary policy must shift 
the loan supply schedule. Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) show that 
monetary policy works partly through a bank loan channel.  
 
A change in interest rates can affect spending decisions through two additional channels that are related to a 
country’s financial structure.  The so-called, credit and broad credit channels, see Bernanke and Gertler, 
1995. The credit channel works when loans and bonds are imperfect substitutes in the balance sheets of banks 
and firms: following a squeeze in liquidity, banks reduce the amount of loans they supply; firms could turn to 
the bond market, but if bonds and loans are imperfect substitutes, the external finance premium will go up, 
amplifying the effects of the monetary tightening. A broad credit channel, instead, works independently of the 
imperfect substitutability between loan and bonds: it is associated with the credit constraints which may arise 
when firms’ ability to borrow depends on the availability of collateral. An increase in interest rates reduces 
the market value of collateral (real estate values, for instance) thus affecting a firm’s access to bank lending. 
(See Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997.) 
  
The most convincing empirical studies on the relevance of the credit channel have used microeconomic data, 
and have investigated whether the responses of banks and firms to a shift in monetary policy differ according 
to their characteristics, their size in particular. Small firms are more likely to be liquidity constrained and to 
depend on banks for financing. Similarly small banks find it more difficult to insulate their loans' portfolio 
from a squeeze in central bank liquidity. This is because a small bank typically cannot use bond holdings as a 
buffer. 
 
The credit channel is relevant in contiental Europe, where banks provide the bulk of firms’ financing needs. 
The contrast with the US and the UK is particularly striking: British and American firms raise on the capital 
market 3-4 times as many funds as any continental European firm, with the possible exception of France, 
where securities’ markets have recently developed quite fast.  
 
Banks and Credit Rationing 
 
The risk averse firm, and the consequent multiple determinants of investment, is an important component of 
investment. The same factors that make firms risk averse also make banks – a special category of firms – risk 
averse. The consequence is that when their net worth declines, they will faced the increased chance of 
bankruptcy and thus will shift their portfolio towards safer activities like investing in Treasury Bills. The 
result could be a reduced supply of funds, higher lending rates, and even greater credit rationing. 
In addition to the conventional Keynesian "money channel" (an increase to the money supply leads to lower 
interest rates to induce people to hold the additional money, and thus to greater investment and output), 
monetary policy can work through the "credit channel" (see Blinder and Stiglitz 1983, Bernanke and Blinder 
1988 and Stiglitz and Weiss 1992). Monetary policy also has effects on credit availability and thus 
investment. Take a decrease in the discount rate, which, among other things, raises the real wealth of banks, 
making them more willing to bear risk and therefore to make more loans. Because the ratio of loans to net 
worth is very large, even small changes in net worth can have a large impact on loans. 
 
Parenthetically, not only has modern finance emphasized the relative importance of this credit channel, it has 
actually challenged the validity of the older "money" channel, as an increasingly large fraction of money 
bears interest, as the ratio of transactions involved in exchanges of assets to those related to income 
generating activities has increased, as it has been recognized that this relationship itself changes dramatically 
over time and over the cycle, and as new developments in financial markets make an increasingly large 
fraction of transactions not dependent on money, as conventionally defined. 
The focus on the credit channel of transmission has several important implications for the conduct of 
monetary policy: The relationship between money and credit will change over the business cycle. Similarly, 
the relationship between interest rates and output will change over the business cycle. In particular, monetary 
policy may have little effect during recessions because the excess liquidity in the banking system will mean 
that it has little effect on the availability of credit, and can thus only operate through the conventional, and 
  14 weaker, "money channel." Movements in interest rates will not always be a good gauge of the effects of 
monetary policy. Monetary policy can have large effects even with little movement in the real interest rate.  
Monetary policy will matter less as substitutes for bank lending, like commercial paper, are developed. But 
informational considerations, namely the bad signal of trying to avoid bank loans, will probably continue to 
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